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Abstract. France is currently embarking upon a drastic reform of quantitative water 
resources management. This reform relies on two principles: the definition of an 
upper limit to water abstraction per water body and the decentralization of the 
responsibility for allocating water among users, in particular in the agricultural sector. 
This paper looks at possible institutional arrangements and incentive-based economic 
instruments which could be used to implement this reform. It particularly focuses on 
issues and options related to the enforcement of water allocation within the 
agricultural sector. We present three water management scenarios relying on four 
levers: economic incentives, transparency, negotiation, joint liability. Scenarios were 
evaluated through 16 scenario workshops in five French case studies, gathering 124 
farmers and agricultural stakeholders in total. This paper presents the results of the 
workshops through a semi-quantitative analysis of the arguments given by the 
participants. 
1 Introduction 
In France, as in many other EU countries, groundwater development has 
occurred in an institutional setting that imposed few if any limits on 
groundwater use. For want of time, money and personnel, state services 
cannot ensure that all wells are notified and authorized discharges are 
complied with. In several parts of France, this has resulted in declining water 
tables, with significant impacts on dependent rivers and ecosystems. 
Until the mid-1990’s, local authorities reacted by establishing water 
restriction rules (irrigation bans). According to the French Water Law of 
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, this crisis management system must now be replaced by a structural 
approach based on a quota system. In aquifers considered at risk for over-
exploitation, hydrogeological studies are conducted to assess the total 
maximum volume that can be abstracted. This volume is then shared among 
users. Where over-exploitation is the result of intense irrigation use, a local 
Groundwater User Association –GWUA- (Organisme Unique de Gestion 
Collective in French) must be established. GWUAs are in charge of 
apportioning among farmers the amount of water allocated to the irrigated 
agriculture. This context typically reflects the public policy transition 
described by Petit (Petit, 2004), who identifies a shift in paradigm from a 
dichotomous state or market regulation to one involving stakeholders and that 
relates to the notion of governance. How this new form of governance can be 
put in place remains an open issue. GWUAs can be considered as micro-
institutions which are “inserted between global rules that circumscribe the 
environmental context on the one hand, and agents, organizations and 
contractual agreements they are tied with on the other hand
2” (Ménard, 2003). 
Such intermediary institutions adapt general institutional rules to effective 
local organizations and allow transaction costs to be reduced. As to 
groundwater, it is assumed that a locally-designed institution will be more 
efficient than the government at enforcing a groundwater quota system. 
Our work was conducted in this context. It aims at exploring how economic 
tools can be used by the newly established GWUAs to ensure compliance 
with allocated volumes. Such tools are intended to counterbalance farmers’ 
propensity to exceed their quota in order to cope with climate variability and 
other sources of environmental and economic uncertainties. This is typically 
an enforcement problem which we are tackling in this paper. 
The literature abounds in propositions concerning economic incentives to 
solve similar common-pool resource (CPR) problems. Our work fits into this 
literature that analyses the link between management tools and the 
institutional context. Through detailed case studies, tools for CPR 
management are analyzed, explicitly looking at the place they occupy in a 
broader institutional pattern. This helps in analyzing the factors that determine 
the effectiveness, practical feasibility and social acceptability of the economic 
instruments. 
                                                     
1
 Loi n° 2006-1772 du 30 décembre 2006 sur l'eau et les milieux aquatiques Journal 
Officiel de la République Française, n°303 du 31 décembre 2006 
2
 Ménard C., 2003, "L'approche néo-institutionnelle : des concepts, une méthode, des 
2
 Ménard C., 2003, "L'approche néo-institutionnelle : des concepts, une méthode, des 
résultats", Cahiers d'Economie Politique, 44, p.114 
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One of the innovations of the paper is to examine tools that could be 
implemented in the future, in a context of groundwater policy reform. Unlike 
most studies which conduct ex-post analysis of factors determining the 
effectiveness of CPR management instruments, we adopt a participatory 
foresight approach aimed at designing instruments for the 2020-2030 
timeframe. This approach is deployed in five French case studies 
representative of the diversity of hydrogeological and agricultural conditions. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present a 
framework to analyze alternative decentralized groundwater management 
institutional setups. We use this framework to design three decentralized 
groundwater management institutional scenarios which are subsequently 
debated with stakeholders. These three scenarios are presented in the third 
section, which also describes the methodology deployed to evaluate the 
scenarios with stakeholders and briefly presents the case studies. The fourth 
section presents the results obtained, highlighting the advantages, 
disadvantages, limitations, conditions and risks involved with the instruments 
considered. 
2 Theoretical concepts and associated literature 
2.1 Conceptual framework 
The objective of the work presented in this paper is to design and evaluate 
institutional scenarios for decentralizing groundwater management. 
Decentralization is understood here as a partial withdrawal of the State and a 
transfer of its responsibilities to users, represented by an intermediary 
institution designated, in the remainder of this paper, as GWUA. Each 
scenario defines a micro-institution which ensures a number of processes. 
These processes can be organized in various ways, and each particular 
decentralized groundwater management set-up consists of a unique mix of 
these (Figure 1). 
The “external interaction” process defines the State-GWUA relationship. 
It is designed to ensure that the total groundwater volume allocated to the 
GWUA is complied with.  
The five other processes are intended to regulate the relationship between 
the GWUA and the individual farmers. The “decision-making” process is 
characterized by who the decision-makers are (all members, elected 
representatives, wise persons,…), the decision-making mode (majority vote or 
consensus, consultative participation of members,…) and the scope of the 
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decision. We consider here that decisions deal solely with water allocation 
and the incentives to be implemented.  
The “financing” process corresponds to how the GWUA’s operating costs 
are covered. This relates to fees that can be charged to users and to 
expenditures and investment planning.  
The “water allocation” process consists of rules that set the amount of water 
each farmer is entitled to. It may also define how this allocation may be 
modulated notably via negotiations. 
The “enforcement” process consists in providing farmers with incentives 
for complying with their water entitlements. This process may rely on a 
system of random controls and fines, subsidies or taxes, transparency and 
social control, etc.  
The “conflict resolution” process refers to routine discussions or forums 
that reduce tensions, but also to the GWUA’s capability to resolve exceptional 
disputes between users by means of a justice-like power. It also defines how 
to deal with farmers who refuse to comply with decisions taken by the 
GWUA. 
This paper focuses on the enforcement process. It investigates how 
different tools can be combined to increase the probability that agricultural 
groundwater users do comply with the allocation rules. Several instruments 
are considered, in particular financial incentives and increased transparency. 
We also investigate how enforcement can be improved by changing allocation 
rules, for instance through allowing farmers to renegotiate their initial 
allocation within small groups. 
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Fig. 1. Main processes performed by a micro-institution ensuring decentralized 
groundwater management. Subsystems enclosed in dotted lines remain unchanged in 
our scenarios. 
2.2 Four levers for improving water allocation enforcement in a 
decentralized scheme 
In this paper, we will be considering four main levers that can be activated 
by a local organization in charge of apportioning a natural resource 
(groundwater, in our case): 
- Economic incentives, intended to promote users’ decisions compatible 
with the targeted apportionment plan or discourage free-riding 
behaviors; including payments that reward desirable behaviors and 
penalties that sanction free-riding ones. 
- Negotiation, which intends to increase flexibility, allowing temporary 
reallocation among users; it can be allowed on a bilateral or multilateral 
basis, and can occur within predefined groups or in the community as a 
whole, under supervision by the GWUA. 
- Transparency, which consists in publicizing information on 
individuals’ withdrawals, assuming that the social pressure exerted by 
others will make free-riding behavior socially costly.  
- Group responsibility, which consists in allocating water to groups of 
users and empowering them to apportion their collective entitlement 
among themselves. 
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This section conducts a succinct overview of the literature concerning these 
four levers. 
 Economic incentives 
The effects of monetary sanctions or rewards on the behaviour of agents 
confronted with a problem of collective action have been widely studied, 
mobilising micro-economic modelling and experimental economics 
approaches. These studies demonstrate the effectiveness of these tools 
(d'Adda, 2011;  del Pilar Moreno-Sánchez and Maldonado, 2010;  Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000;  Masclet, et al., 2003;  Rapoport and Au, 2001;  Sefton, et al., 
2007;  Travers, et al., 2011). The impact of using reward alone seems less 
efficient (Rapoport and Au, 2001) and less durable over time (Sefton, et al., 
2007). However, it sometimes turns out to be more effective than sanctioning 
(Travers, et al., 2011). Sefton et al. (2007) propose to couple these two forms 
of incentives which, in their case, have enabled optimum levels of individual 
contribution to be achieved. 
The efficiency of these tools depends on their design. The level of the 
incentive is a determining factor. A sanction should be severe enough to 
provide incentive and moderate enough to be economically and politically 
acceptable. The regulatory authority is also a decisive factor: tested in 
experimental economics, regulation exerted from the inside appears to yield 
better results than regulation imposed by an outside player (Travers and al., 
2011; del Pilar-Moreno-Sanchez and Maldonado, 2010). Efficiency will differ 
according to whether it is lump-sum or proportional to the discrepancy 
between the prescribed behaviour and the one actually observed. Another 
important dissuasive factor lies in the probability of incurring the sanction 
(Murphy and Cardenas, 2004) which, if not high enough, is liable to cancel 
out its incentive impact. 
Rapoport and Au (2001) bring up the issue of funding the incentive 
mechanisms and cite the advantage of a system that allows the rewards to be 
covered by the revenue from the penalties. While it has also been discussed by 
Collins and Maille (Collins and Maille, 2011), this system of compensation 
between penalty and reward has never actually been put to the test. 
The variable nature of these results, which prevents us from generalizing 
their main conclusions, can be imputed, on the one hand, to the diversity of 
the contexts and how the experimental assessment system was designed and, 
on the other hand, to the specification itself of these tools. This recognized 
variability in results justifies the multiple terrains and contexts that have been 
chosen to test these tools. 
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 Negotiation 
The second lever examined is negotiation. The groundwater demand for 
farmers is liable to vary substantially from one year to the next, owing to 
changes in the choice of crops or external disruptive factors. Complying with 
an unvarying allocation may represent a very stringent constraint for farmers 
and give rise to enforcement problems. In this context, allowing farmers to 
negotiate with each other injects a degree of flexibility which may allow an 
overall compliance to be achieved. 
This approach involving agreed upon rules or arrangements has proven 
relatively advantageous for controlling over-abstraction of a resource held in 
common, and this is true of numerous and contrasting contexts ((Lopez-Gunn, 
2003;  Ostrom, 2000;  Shah, 2012;  VanSteenbergen, 2006). Its efficiency, as 
compared to external regulatory systems and economic incentives, has been 
demonstrated in many contexts (Travers et al., 2011; del Pilar-Moreno-
Sanchez and Maldonado, 2010 and Murphy and Cardenas, 2004). However, it 
can only be of benefit if a certain number of conditions are met: a detailed 
knowledge of external factors, an awareness of players’ interdependence, a 
quantified assessment of profits dependent on the action of others (Murphy 
and Cardenas, 2004) and previous acquaintance among players (Cardenas, 
2004). 
 Transparency 
The third lever is transparency, that is, the disclosure of the decisions or 
individual actions of agents to all members of the concerned community. 
Such a tool has been tested in experimental economics for a variety of 
scenarios and its positive effects on behavior was demonstrated repeatedly 
(Masclet et al., 2003; Fehr and Gatcher, 2000). It is sometimes shown to be 
more effective than a penalty (Foulon, et al., 2002). It is often advocated as an 
auxiliary management tool, its main advantage being its very favorable cost-
benefit ratio. However, some studies would indicate that its effect varies from 
one community to another, being conditioned by the prior existence of a norm 
defining what constitutes virtuous behavior (d’Adda, 2011; Travers et al., 
2011). Its effectiveness likewise depends on the weight carried by reputation. 
Transparency may take on a variety of forms according to whether individual 
or collective behaviors are being disclosed, and whether by name or 
anonymously. 
The main risk attaching to this tool is the emergence and propagation of a 
weak or even counterproductive social norm (mediocre contributions, to the 
common good, widespread over-exploitation…) which may result in a race to 
the bottom (Zafar, 2011). 
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 Joint liability 
Irrigators are a special class of groundwater user insofar as they constitute a 
professional corporate body that shares information among its members, 
communicating with each other about their practices and having experimented 
at times with collective management (with the example of collective 
management of farm equipment via CUMA
3
 groups). For this reason, 
allocating a volume to a group that is collectively responsible emerges as a 
means to provide flexibility while at the same time guaranteeing compliance 
with the volume authorized. 
Studies on group dynamics have been developed on the premise that the 
agents have more information on their reciprocal actions than the controller or 
principal. (Isik and Sohngen, 2003;  Romstad, 2003) Isik and Sohngen (2003) 
built a group contract model relative to a diffuse pollution context, integrating 
the social control factor, which is shown to be essential in order for the model 
to be effective. This contract is based on (i) performance, i.e., an obligation of 
results as opposed to means, (ii) voluntary participation (iii) a flat-rate 
payment by way of incentive to adhere to the contract and (iv) a performance-
related payment as incentive to abide by the contract. 
Finally, in our context of decentralized management as embodied by 
GWUA, our contract adopts the “nested enterprise” principle developed by 
Ostrom (Ostrom, 2000), which relies on nested self-regulation, accountability 
of the groundwater users and reinforced social control. 
3 Scenarios for decentralized groundwater management in France 
This section presents three scenarios of micro-institutions that could be 
implemented to solve the groundwater allocation enforcement problem 
described above. We start with a description of the current institutional set-up 
which regulates access to and allocation of groundwater in France. Next, we 
describe the institutional changes that are slated to occur by 2020. Three 
contrasting scenarios are subsequently delineated. We then describe the 
methodology used to discuss these scenarios with stakeholders in five 
different regions of France. 
 
 
                                                     
3
 Coopérative d’Utilisation du Matériel Agricole 
Conférence ESEE 2013 : Ecological Economics and Institutional Dynamics 
10ème conférence biennale de la société européenne d'économie écologique 
17-21 juin 2013 Lille (France)   
 9 
3.1. The current context and possible evolution 
Following the promulgation of the 2006 Water Law, groundwater 
management is undergoing drastic institutional changes in France. Prior to the 
reform, access to – and use of – groundwater was regulated by local 
governmental agencies. Agencies grant licenses to the owners of wells and 
boreholes, specifying the maximum discharge and, in water-scarce areas, the 
maximum volume of water that can be pumped. Decisions on volume 
allocation are made by governmental agencies after consultation of the 
Chamber of Agriculture. The State has sole responsibility for enforcing water 
allocation, although it lacks the human and financial resources to conduct the 
required controls. Conflict resolution relies fully on judicial procedures, but 
court cases are often abandoned and penalties charged to offenders are 
generally not dissuasive.  
The 2006 Water Law introduces major changes in this institutional set-up. 
It requires that Ground Water Users Associations be established in all basins 
identified as over-exploited. These associations will be responsible for sharing 
between farmers the maximum volume that can be abstracted. Allocation 
rules can thus be crafted by this new micro-institution, in a decentralized 
decision-making framework that gives much more autonomy to farmers than 
previously. GWUAs will also be more significantly involved in conflict 
resolution and will have the possibility to design new instruments to ensure 
that their members comply with the allocation rules. How this can be done 
remains an open issue. The scenarios that follow intend to unfold three 
possible ways of addressing this challenge within the 2020-2030 timeframe. 
In order to design the foresight scenarios, three main assumptions were 
made as to the most plausible future evolution of the institutional context, in 
continuation of the reform initiated by the 2006 Water Law.  
- The first assumption is that the legal status of the GWUAs will be 
reinforced, providing them with a clear legal framework for crafting 
water allocation rules, enforcement mechanisms and conflict resolution 
procedures. GWUA will most likely be allowed to levy fees to cover 
their operational costs.  
- A second assumption is that each farmer will receive an individual water 
entitlement that will be valid for a specific period of time (15 years). 
Individual allocations are assumed to be based (i) on historical records of 
water use and (ii) on an analysis of actual water demand, considering the 
assets and crop specialization of each farm.   
- We further assumed that access to information related to groundwater use 
will be facilitated by changing technologies. Smart meters, already 
widely used in urban areas, are likely to be adopted in agriculture, 
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allowing accurate monitoring of pumping in all wells, with a daily, if not 
hourly, time-step. This information can easily be made available to 
selected beneficiaries via the Internet, including government agencies 
and the GWUA. 
3.2. Negotiation and transparency  
The first scenario combines two instruments:  
- Transparency: we assume that information on individual 
withdrawal is made available not only to government agencies and 
to the GWUA, but also toall members of the GWUA. The 
underlying hypothesis is that this enhanced transparency will 
increase incentives for farmers to comply with the allocation rules, 
their individual behavior being observable by their peers. 
- Negotiation: GWUAs offer a suitable context that allows farmers to 
adjust their individual allocations via bilateral or multilateral 
negotiations with other farmers. Indeed, farmers need flexibility if 
they are to adapt to unforeseen events. In this scenario, we assume 
that the required flexibility is made possible through a negotiation 
to be held pre-season and under strict supervision by the GWUA. 
3.3. Combining positive and negative incentives to enforce water 
allocation: the payment-penalty system (P&P) 
This scenario assumes that the best way to enforce water allocation rules is 
to provide users with strong economic incentives. We propose to use positive 
and negative incentives simultaneously, as suggested by Sefton et al. (2007). 
Negative incentives consist in sanctioning farmers who use more water than 
what they are entitled to. The sanction consists of a fine which is charged for 
each cubic meter pumped in excess of the limit. This sanction could be 
progressive. The sums recovered would in turn be used to subsidized farmers 
using less than their water entitlement. This subsidy would be granted 
proportionally to the volume of water “saved”. The amount of the subsidy, 
expressed in €/m3 saved, would depend directly on the number of farmers 
infringing their quota in the same year. . While the fine level would remain 
stable over a period of years, the subsidy would vary considerably over time. 
It would be low in wet years, as few farmers would pay a fine and high during 
dry years, when many farmers infringe on their quota, providing real 
incentives for other farmers to reduce irrigation. Overall, the proposed 
instrument should converge towards a simultaneous water and financial 
equilibrium. The financial dependence between farmers who save water and 
those who withdraw too much enhances the probability of sanction 
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application. Finally, the system should be acceptable to farmers for two 
reasons: sanctions are applied by peers, and money does not exit the 
agricultural sector. 
3.4. The joint liability scenario 
The last scenario proposes to create user groups, to merge their individual 
water entitlement into a group entitlement and make them jointly liable vis-à-
vis the GWUA. Users groups are established on a voluntary basis, and their 
joint liability is formalized in a legally binding contract. Farmers gain two 
benefits from entering a group: reduced fees paid to the GWUA, and 
increased flexibility concerning water use (since they can make any 
arrangements concerning water use they wish with farmers of their group). If 
the group exceeds its water entitlement, the fine is doubled as compared to 
what individual farmers are charged. The group is jointly liable for paying the 
fine. For groups, as for individuals, the fine is charged proportionally to the 
excess pumping. This scenario assumes that joint liability will reinforce 
individual responsibility cooperation between members to reallocate water in 
an optimal manner, and is better able to factor in unforeseen events that may 
occur during the season. Group members have access to detailed information 
on volumes abstracted by each well of the group (combined use of smart 
meters and a web-based information system), which allows a mutual control 
within the group. 
The three scenarios are summarized in Table 1, below.  
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Table 1. Main assumptions in the three scenarios 
 
 
4 Methodology for evaluating scenarios 
4.1 Methodology for debating scenarios with stakeholders 
The theoretical scenarios dealt with above were presented and debated with 
stakeholders in five different regions in France, where the regulation of 
groundwater abstraction represents a real challenge. The objective was to 
identify factors which could impede (or facilitate) the implementation of the 
instruments described in the scenario.  
A key assumption underlying our methodology is that the environmental 
and economic efficiency of the instruments considered may vary significantly 












in water allocation 
possible through 




merged for farmers 
signing a contract
For individual members: 
fine
For group members: joint 
liability, fine, reduced fees
Enforcement Transparency P&P
GWUA is responsible vis-à-vis  the State for compliance with the 
maximum abstractable volume
GWUA levies fees from farmers and receives public subsidies from 
the River Basin Agency
Routine discussions. Possibility for the GWUA to exclude members not 
complying with its rules. Government agencies then have the possibility 
to cancel the groundwater-use licence





Individual water entitlements established for 15 years, based on 
historical use of water, irrigated area and soil type
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context. We further consider that stakeholders, including farmers, are able to 
identify these factors, which justifies involving them in the research process. 
We also assume that these factors may differ from one case study to another, 
which justifies consulting stakeholders in various contexts.  
The method selected to involve stakeholders consists in organizing scenario 
workshops. A total of 16 workshops, mobilizing 124 participants, were 
organized in five selected case studies. The scenarios were adapted to each 
local context and presented as a short narrative, written as a press release. 
Participants were invited to think about their possible advantages and 
drawbacks, assuming they would be implemented from 2020 on. The 
workshops lasted four hours on average, and involved 6 to 15 participants. 
Two types of participants were invited to take part: farmers (80), and 
official representatives of organizations involved in agricultural water 
management (44). These two categories were purposely divided into separate 
groups, given the high level of tension that existed between them. 
4.2 Selected case studies 
Five case studies were selected based on discussions with experts. All areas 
are ones where groundwater is officially considered as over-exploited. 
Stakeholders who were invited to participate in the scenario workshops were 
thus fully aware of the stakes and potentially interested in debating over 
possible instruments for regulating groundwater use.  
Case studies were also selected in such a way as to represent a diversity of 
agricultural and hydrogeological situations. Groundwater characteristics vary 
significantly from one case to another in terms of geology (karstic or alluvial 
aquifer) and inertia (a few months to several years). Agricultural systems also 
differ, with industrial vegetable production in the Serre basin, apple and cereal 
production in the Tarn-et-Garonne, cereals and corn in the three others. The 
location of the case studies is depicted on a map below.  
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Fig. 2. Location of the five case studies in France 
 
4.3 Quantitative treatment 
Debates were tape-recorded to allow a detailed ex-post analysis of the 
arguments quoted by participants. These arguments were classified by type 
(advantages, drawbacks, risks involved or implementation condition), then by 
topic (injustice, incentive, legitimacy …), and finally by detailed argument. 
Preliminary quantitative treatment consists in arguments codification and 
frequency calculation. For ease of reading, we will only be specifying 
hereinafter in square brackets the number of workshops out of the 16 (or 13 
for the first scenario) in which the argument arose at least once. 
5 Results 
Generally speaking, a certain number of arguments were mentioned in all 
scenarios or workshops. These elements related to the hypotheses of the future 
projected by the 2006 Water Law, which a majority of farmers disapprove, 
rather than scenarios mechanisms themselves. In particular, it is still very 
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difficult to discuss the matter of “quotas”. Very reticent about this principle, 
irrigators insist upon the necessity of their being part of the process whereby 
such volumes are calculated, so that they are fair and acceptable. Moreover, 
these individual references must remain constant on a multi-annual basis to 
allow pluriannual investment decisions. They would not accept that such a 
system be applied to an abundant resource. Indeed, acknowledgement of over-
exploitation of the groundwater resource is not shared by, and is even hotly 
contested by, the farming community. Once these conditions have been set, 
most farmers accept to project themselves into the proposed scenarios. They 
appreciate the main objectives: to render the strict quota system more flexible 
through reallocation mechanisms that allow the economic valorization of the 
total volume allocated to be maximized. 
We will be presenting hereinafter the main reactions of the participants 
with respect to our three proposed management scenarios, highlighting for 
each the respective advantages, drawbacks, risks involved, and acceptable and 
effective implementation conditions. 
5.1 Transparency 
Transparency has given rise to sharply differentiated reactions. 
For some, it is construed as the means to establish a true self-regulation of 
withdrawals [5] by irrigators insofar as it allows vigilant monitoring of both 
individual and collective abstractions [1]. It reinforces social control [4]. It 
has the potential to institutionalize social norms (relative to the periods of 
starting, stopping or resuming irrigation) and results in water savings: “It is 
true that it may allow, when one is hesitant, to cancel the last irrigation turn. 
The resource is also better allocated [4] owing to real-time adjustments, 
information on crop requirements (through how others act) [1], but also on 
assessing unused volumes [3]. 
Nevertheless, many question its legitimacy and acceptability [9]. It comes 
across as an infringement on individual liberties [4] and makes the assumption 
that farmers will not comply with their quotas [1]. This tool may fuel 
dissentions [5] since transparency leads to a form of self-police implying 
mechanisms decried by some (“denunciation”, “policing”) [6]: “creating 
problems where there aren’t any”, “causing tensions to mount”, notably 
between adaptable crops and those with incompressible needs [1]. This tool 
would be neither advantageous [2] nor effective [2]: certain exceedances are 
voluntary and assumed by “hard-liners” who are already identified [1]; 
groundwater users will continue to save their crops in times of drought [2]. 
Some even cast doubt on the pertinence of the chosen indicator (the volume 
abstracted) [3]: a farmer’s practices cannot be judged based on this sole 
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criterion. The measure of the effort should actually depend on the crops, the 
material, the time of year, possible leakage [2]... They accordingly favor the 
choice of a means-based (practices) indicator instead of a results-related one. 
Lastly, as shown in the literature but also by real-life examples, 
transparency is liable to promote the emergence of an undesirable social norm 
[1], even leading to widespread non-compliance with entitlements. 
A certain number of conditions and improvements have accordingly been 
proposed to enhance the acceptability of transparency: data access should be 
restricted to the OUGC and the user itself [4], the nature of data available to 
all being less personal (on a collective level? anonymous?); a mediator should 
be placed in charge of resolving cases of exceedance as opposed to internal 
policing [1]; communication of information accessible to the public must be 
properly handled to avoid demonising [1]. 
In conclusion, transparency would seem to be all the more effective as the 
basins where it is applied are limited in size [1], and all the more acceptable 
insofar as it is justified by a generalization of the principle over all users 
(including drinking water, industry...), as well as over all types of information 
(water needs, sectorial constraints...) [2]. 
5.2 Negotiation 
Visibly transparency and negotiation cannot be dissociated: transparency 
thus comes across as an essential basis for negotiation over volumes [3], for it 
rules out suspicion. 
The negotiation tool was perceived as globally positive in principle [3], 
despite the fact that quite a large number of limitations were identified as to 
its implementation. 
Its main advantage is that it allows an improved allocation of the resource 
to be achieved [6]: through the mutualisation of needs and the adjustments it 
allows between groundwater users in line with crop rotations and other 
constraints. The allocation can be adjusted within an annual context (climate, 
agronomy...). Likewise, an agreement over water volumes prior to the 
irrigation season offers a better guarantee to groundwater users of being able 
to rely on their volumes, avoiding emergency management and having 
restrictions imposed [1]. 
Negotiation also promotes dialogue, accountability and conflict resolution 
[3]. Some comment on this: “We talk about it, have a row about it, fight over 
it [...] but we do manage to communicate”. Negotiation is a good way to 
maintain dialogue, whether in the farming sector or between irrigators and the 
administration. Finally, some speak of successes of negotiation in certain 
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areas not far removed from those addressed [2]. In the Isère Department, 
adjacent to the eastern Lyon region, the Chamber of Agriculture has been 
organizing negotiation meetings for a number of years. This process has been 
thoroughly appropriated by the users, who now work things out 
spontaneously. Such transfers are also commonplace in the ASA
4
, although 
they are marginal in terms of the volumes exchanged. 
However, certain limitations have been identified. First of all, the 
individualistic nature of the farmers might prevent them from coming to terms 
over volumes [7]. Furthermore, farmers stress how little latitude they have in 
reducing their withdrawals [7]: the available volume is extremely restrictive; 
climate and needs uncertainties are too large for them to be able to run the risk 
of relinquishing a volume of water [2]; irrigators have investments on which 
they must obtain a return and which require an optimization of the irrigation 
potential; lastly, certain holdings have incompressible needs (such as 
arboriculture). In the end, most consider that the exchanges would take place 
on the fringes, but to little avail, if not the contrary: the creation of tensions, 
notably between crops that can be adapted (cereals) and those with invariable 
needs (arboriculture) [2]. Lastly, the capacity of pumps would in itself place a 
limit on volume exchanges [1]. 
A negotiation process that is both equitable et efficient can only be 
guaranteed if: organisational rules and a framework for discussion are clear-
cut and accepted by all [3]; exchanges are balanced [1] ; individual quotas are 
ensured over the long term [2]; and exchanges are non-monetized [3]. 
Some consider the negotiation solution only in specific contexts:, the 
presence of cereal growers, better able to adapt, is necessary [2]; the smaller 
the group and the better the members know each other outside the context, the 
easier negotiation will be [2]. Other points have been brought up: opening up 
possibilities for exchanges throughout the season [1] ; turning the water over 
to the OUGC, placed in charge of redistributing it[1]. Many agree over the 
need for a change in attitudes [1]. Lastly, negotiation stands no chance of 
being useful and effective without transparency established at the outset [1]. 
5.3 The Payment-Penalty System 
A majority of participants reject the payment-penalty system (P&P). First, 
they are opposed to the principle itself [15], bringing to mind the “carrot and 
stick” philosophy. Purely economic regulation encourages irresponsibility and 
                                                     
4
 Association Syndicale Autorisée (Authorized Syndical Association): An ASA of 
irrigation is a water user association whose members share infrastructure for 
distributing water. 
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moves farther away from the objective of a balanced management of the 
resource [6]. For many, the system is “perverse” [3]: reduction in agricultural 
production [3] ; financial transfers between irrigators [1]; modification in 
incentives to produce and consequently a change in the choice of crops (only 
those crops with the highest added value will continue to be irrigated), 
inducing imbalance in downstream sectors [2]. Some accordingly point to a 
risk of plant relocations [4] and, more broadly, to endangered regional 
competitiveness [6]. Assigning a value to water thus seems hazardous [1], and 
many people evoke the risk of conflicts and distortions linked to the system’s 
financial aspect (such as the development of a black market or of pressure 
brought to bear on the OUGC...) [7]. 
Such a system would give rise to many injustices [15] : it would generate 
deadweight effects [3], unwarranted rents and opportunistic behavior on the 
part of irrigators who effortlessly cut back on their consumption (owing to 
favorable climates or soils [2], an unlimited substitution resource...); many 
groundwater users would have no choice between payment and penalty [5], 
being forced to pay the latter: young farmers bearing a heavy debt load [1], 
long-term crops with uncompressible needs [5], sandy or shallow soils [1],... 
From a practical standpoint, the system appears too complex to gain a 
thorough understanding [4] of, whether for the manager [1] or the irrigator 
[3]: the calculations, overly subject to uncertainties, interfere with the 
legibility and incentive value of this tool. 
Lastly, the incentives would not be robust enough to weigh on practices [1] 
and would be ineffective in ensuring the abstractable volume would be 
respected [3], since exceedances would outweigh the water saved, particularly 
during dry years [3]. Indeed, the latitude available for reducing withdrawals is 
slim [8]: the volume allocated is already very small [3], efforts at reduction 
have already been implemented [2], investments have not yet yielded their 
benefits and certain water needs cannot be further restricted (arboriculture, 
vegetable crops under contract with imposed quality standards) [1]. Moreover, 
the payment is not a certainty [6] and is not the determining factor in the 
choice of crop rotation [5], as is the price of cereal grains [5]. Finally, the size 
of the penalty is not sufficiently deterrent to reduce withdrawals for high 
added value crops (arboriculture, corn, seed corn...) [4] or during droughts [2]. 
The incentive aspect of the tool is nevertheless a subject for debate: some 
participants are convinced [9] that it induces farmers to adapt their crops and 
revise their conception of irrigation (“it only works when you dig into your 
wallet”) [4]: indeed some farmers consider the amounts to be dissuasive and 
coherent with the fee structure in effect in ASAs. The fact that the penalty is 
proportional to the level of exceedance enhances the incentive value 
compared to a fine-based system, currently in place [1]; this system also 
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satisfies the need for a repressive framework to deal with excessive use [4], 
but also the need to reward efforts which at present receive little or no 
recompense [2]. This principle is all the more valued by farmers because it 
allows them to remain in an individual, non-collective strategy [1]. Another 
signal advantage: the penalty is an element of flexibility, albeit costly, 
compared to a rigid individual volume [3]. Lastly, the closed financial 
framework managed by the OUGC is perceived particularly favorably [3], 
provided the OUGC properly controls its implementation [4], specifying sums 
that are clear, acceptable and guaranteed [3]. 
Ultimately, the Payment-Penalty system tends to have been viewed 
negatively, but it has allowed interesting alternative propositions to be 
brought to light. To make it more incentive or equitable, the level of the 
penalty should be indexed on the climate of the year [1], on cereal prices [1] 
or on the flow-rate of rivers [1]. Many would envisage the penalty in terms of 
volume rather than financially [4]. The payment is likewise subject to debate: 
some consider it not legitimate, with only the penalty that should remain [3]; 
others propose to set its level ex ante in order to render it more incentive [3]; 
some suggest that it should be defined in terms of volume (usable the 
following year) [1]; finally, others propose to replace it by investing the 
amount of the penalty in measures that incite water savings or in the creation 
of resources [5]. One participant even suggests creating an insurance fund that 
could be mobilized during dry years to compensate farmers who refrained 
from irrigating, in order to ensure the balance of the resource [1]. 
5.4 The Contract of Solidarity 
The contract of solidarity has given rise to contrasted reactions between 
different types of terrain and different players (institutional or irrigators). 
The principle is viewed favourably by a majority of institutional players 
and many farmers in basins already facing water scarcity [10]: it would be the 
“ideal solution”, “theoretically” [2] at least. One group even proposes to set it 
up as soon as may be [1], with others also considering it could be 
implemented rapidly [2]. It starts out, indeed, with a collective approach 
familiar to the agricultural sector [12]: farmers are already practicing it when 
they pool equipment or labor [1], through establishing protected seeding areas 
[1] or pooling water distribution [7]. 
It is based on the self-management principle [9], thus on accountability [5], 
which offers the advantage of escaping oversight by the administration [3]. 
It is a tool that wagers on human relations [5], founded on the principles of 
solidarity [2], dialogue [1], sharing [2] and confidence [1]. However, human 
relations lie at the heart of the problem today: individualistic reasoning 
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prevails and farmers have a hard time coming to terms with each other [8]. 
This human dimension is also a source of risk: it would be hard to have 
commitments be respected within a group simply by virtue of self-discipline 
or self-policing [5]; risks of conflict are high between farmers [11] notably if 
a collective penalty is imposed [3], but also in the event of a drought [2] or if 
the adherents have the impression that efforts are asymmetrically divided out 
[5]. 
One of the main factors of inefficiency cited by the participants: the risk of 
a low rate of contractualization [13]. The dominance of individualistic 
reasoning [12] would make it impossible to generalize the contract, which 
would only be able to emerge “among friends” [4], and therefore marginally. 
Moreover, there is no advantage for virtuous farmers to enter into a contract 
[1], and they will be unwilling to take the risk of having to pay a collective 
penalty [4]; certain crops always require water [4] and others have variable 
needs that are hard to anticipate [1], which will motivate farmers to retain 
water for safety’s sake [2]; irrigation equipment must be used profitably [2]. 
On a more technical level, other limitations are identified: too little intra-zone 
diversity [3], sectors that are too small [1], insufficient individual pumping 
capacity of ensuring water allocation exchanges [2]. 
Some are convinced that instead of simplifying management, it makes it 
more complicated by inserting an additional echelon [5]. Others have 
misgivings over the contract’s collectivist principle [3] or else fear a 
monetization of exchanges [1]. A feeling of injustice may also develop among 
isolated individuals who, for technical reasons, are unable to adhere to a 
contract [1], but more particularly with members of the group who could be 
penalized without being at fault [3]. Other risks are brought up: contract 
signers will be faced with a dilemma of collective action within the group and 
will tend to reduce their individual efforts in terms of water savings [1]. 
Finally, some individuals fear negative repercussions on the economy, such as 
the relocation of client firms [1]. 
Many mention difficulties in applying the contract [11]: the risk of 
ineffective internal control [5], strong uncertainties (climate-related, 
environmental or economic) that would impact its success [1], the difficulty, 
or even impossibility, of reaching an agreement on certain sensitive 
hydrogeological sectors [2]. 
The economic advantage of adhering to such a contract was debated. 
Economic obstacles might render this tool valueless [6]: the management of a 
farm is individual by nature [1] (individual investments, contracts with firms 
that are incompatible with collective water management); this tool appears too 
restrictive in the eyes of some [1] (additional rules, its administrative and 
human management too heavy), overly rigid (in the event of drought or other 
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unforeseen events) [1] and not incentive enough (small expected gain) [4]. 
But others do point out a few advantages [12]: for managers, it is a cost-
reducing solution [1]; for farmers, an opportunity to maximize revenue [3], by 
playing on complementarities between farms [5], or even pooling crop 
rotation [1]. It affords flexibility [2], and opens up the opportunity for 
avoiding crises and reducing individual constraints [5]. 
Thus, among the conditions that guarantee the success of the contract, 
many are economic in nature [12]. It first appears essential to have, within the 
same basin, a variety of crops [8], with water requirements which are 
heterogeneous and variable over time, so as to ensure reciprocal 
complementarity. Some go so far as to mention the need for pooling crop 
rotation [6], investments [1], and even revenues [1]. It would also seem that 
setting up a contract would be all the easier if crop rotations include a 
minimum of annual crops, like cereals, which readily adapt to variable 
resources [5]. Inducement to contractualize must assume a positive, not a 
negative, aspect [1]: creating additional water reserves in parallel, not 
doubling the penalty in the event of non-compliance [2], continuing to 
propose individual as opposed to collective penalties [2]; some even propose 
to increase the level of penalty for irrigators who remain outside the system so 
as to motivate them to opt into the contracts. 
To guarantee its success, the contract must be properly designed [12]: with 
clearly defined rules of play [4] and terms of governance [6], the intervention 
of a mediator to resolve tensions, the physical capacity for exchange (with 
suitable pumping capacities) [2] and being aware of the situation in real time 
(via information transparency, presupposing a centralized computer support 
facility for the information) [3]. 
Lastly, the contract can only be effective under certain conditions of scale 
and adhesion. Some believe that the contract must cover all the irrigators in a 
given basin [5] and accordingly should be mandatory; for others, this would 
be counter-productive and non-incentive, such that it is of prime importance 
that voluntary adhesion remain a basis for the contract [3]. However, all are 
agreed that each contract must be restricted to a single, coherent 
hydrogeological zone [2]. As to the number of signers, a compromise 
apparently needs to be found between a fairly restricted group within which 
negotiation and social control could be brought to bear  and one with a broad 
enough scope to have a true positive impact on the resource [10]. 
To conclude, the contract of solidarity is perceived relatively positively in 
principle and could be effective provided incentives are strong enough for 
irrigation to start to be viewed in a new light. It is cited by many participants 
as a solution “for the future”, capable of providing answers to mounting 
economic and environmental constraints. 
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6 Conclusion 
In a context of policy reform, our work aimed at exploring and evaluating 
various scenarios of decentralized groundwater management. Farmers will 
likely tend to exceed their quota to cope with climate variability and other 
sources of environmental and economic uncertainties. Therefore, GWUAs 
will need instruments to tackle this enforcement problem. We considered 
GWUAs as micro-institutions in the sense of Ménard (2003). In our 
conceptual framework, such an institution ensures processes than can be 
organized in various ways so that a scenario of management consists of a 
unique combination of these processes. We focused on the enforcement 
process. We explored four levers of enforcement (economic incentives, 
negotiation, transparency and joint liability) and designed three scenarios. 
Although fitting into CPR decentralized management literature, the main 
innovation of this paper was to adopt a participatory foresight approach aimed 
at evaluating tools for the 2020-2030 timeframe. We carried out 16 workshops 
in 5 areas in France, and gathered 124 participants, both institutional 
representatives and farmers. The first scenario, that couples negotiation and 
transparency, gave rise to contrasted reactions. Negotiation has been seen as a 
positive tool, as it improves water allocation, enhances dialogue and can solve 
conflicts, even if individualism is its main obstacle. On the contrary, 
transparency slightly shocked: although increasing social control and allowing 
for informed discussions, it seems hardly legitimate or socially acceptable. 
The penalty-payment scenario raised quite negative reactions: the instrument 
appears ineffective, uncertain and unnecessarily restrictive. Even if the joint 
liability contract has been approved in principle, as it relies on dialogue, 
solidarity and trust, farmers are reluctant to give up decision autonomy and 
become dependent on others’ strategic choices. 
Generally speaking, farmers wanted to draw our attention on their 
incapability, for technical, financial and agronomic reasons, to save 
significant amounts of water in the future. But farmers did not only react to 
our scenarios, as they more widely question the quota system currently being 
set up, based on the assumption that groundwater is overexploited, that they 
also contest. 
In this work, we focused on two processes out of the six a micro-institution 
ensures. Others processes and new combinations can be addressed. 
Particularly, participants emphasized on the necessity that they be associated 
to the decision making process, so that it appears to be a condition for an 
easier rules enforcement. Thus, various decision making processes have to be 
imagined and tested. 
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Finally, the diversity of case studies give rise to an abundance of arguments 
that have now to be analyzed closely in order to identify context factors 
(hydrogeological, agronomic, economic and social factors) that may have 
influenced opinions. This is an essential analysis for helping the design of 
appropriate micro-institutions that have to be suited to each specific situation. 
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